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Agent-Based Spectrum Management Scheme in
Satellite Communication Systems
Feng Li, Member, IEEE, Kwok-Yan Lam, Senior Member, IEEE, Zhengguo Sheng, Senior Member, IEEE,
Weidang Lu, Member, IEEE, Xin Liu, Senior Member, IEEE, and Li Wang
Abstract—Efficient spectrum management has always been an
important issue due to the scarcity of satellite spectral resource,
especially with the ever-increasing broadband demand. This pa-
per proposes a market-driven technique to improve spectrum ef-
ficiency. In practice, spectrum resources are typically allocated in
bulk to terrestrial agents which in turn will resell the bandwidth
to end users of satellite communications. This paper explores
the important role of terrestrial agents which serve as spectrum
sales agents in satellite communications systems. The proposed
approach aims to provide an incentive scheme for the agents to
participate in the spectrum optimization process so as to result
in maximizing the benefit of the agents as well as the satellite
systems. We propose a dynamically optimal cooperation scheme
between terrestrial agents and satellite systems, which is based
on a stochastic process and optimal contract principle. By taking
into consideration the satellite system’s marginal cost related to
transmission capacity in the given bandwidth, terrestrial agent’s
effort and the impact of market volatility, we designed an optimal
incentive model which allows the satellite systems to determine
a threshold value for paying sales commission to terrestrial
agents or triggering contract termination if spectrum utilization
is inefficient. Numerical results are presented to evaluate the
performances of satellite systems’ profits in changing spectrum
market and agency cost undertaken by satellite systems.
Index Terms—Satellite communication systems, spectrum man-
agement, resource optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
SATELLITE users are increasingly dissatisfied with tradi-tional satellite applications of voice, short message and
location positioning. The demands for broadband satellite
services including video streaming, Internet of Things applica-
tions and cloud-based access etc., are undergoing an explosive
This research is supported by the National Research Foundation, Prime
Minister’s Office, Singapore under its Strategic Capability Research Cen-
tres Funding Initiative. Also, this work was supported by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61871348 and Natural
Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province under Grant LY19F010009 and
LY19F010008. (Corresponding author: Xin Liu.)
F. Li is with School of Information and Electronic Engineering, Zhejiang
Gongshang University, Hangzhou, 310018, China. F. Li is also at School
of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University,
639798, Singapore. (fengli2002@yeah.net)
K. Y. Lam is with School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang
Technological University, 639798, Singapore. (kwokyan.lam@ntu.edu.sg)
Z. Sheng is with the Department of Engineering and Design, University of
Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, United Kindom. (z.sheng@sussex.ac.uk)
W. Lu is with College of Information Engineering, Zhejiang University of
Technology, Hangzhou, 310023, China. (luweid@zjut.edu.cn)
X. Liu is with School of Information and Communication Engineer-
ing, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China. (liuxin-
star1984@dlut.edu.cn)
L. Wang is with College of Marine Electrical Engineering, Dalian Maritime
University, Dalian, 116026, China. (liwang2002@dlmu.edu.cn)
growth, which calls for a large number of satellite bands along
with efficient satellite resource management strategy to fit in
[1]-[3].
Remarkable research efforts on enhancing spectrum effi-
ciency in satellite communications systems have been con-
ducted in recent years [4][5]. Multibeam antenna technology
are applied to fulfill spectrum reuse between various cells in
which inter-cell interference restraining is a key factor [6].
Each beam’s wireless resource should be allocated adaptively
according to heterogeneous traffic density. In time division
multiplex satellite systems, rational time-slot and transmit
power resource allocation are essential [7]. Besides, dynamic
spectrum access and sharing between satellite systems and
terrestrial networks help realize efficient use of idle satellite
spectrum [8][9].
Despite research in efficient resource allocation in satellite
communication systems has received growing interests in
recent years, it still requires deeper investigated. As resource
allocation in communication systems always needs to balance
the benefits of different participants, marketed-driven scheme
consisting of auction-based or pricing-based approaches have
been explored. In this connection, however, most of the
existing works mainly focus on investigating spectrum sharing
from the perspectives of dynamic dealing or bargaining be-
tween satellite systems and satellite users [10]-[12]. Very few
research focuses on exploring the role of terrestrial agents in
spectrum management. In practical situations, satellite spec-
trum are typically leased to terrestrial agents which in turn
resell the spectrum to end subscribers. The terrestrial agents
can play a key role in enhancing spectrum efficiency in that,
in order to maximize their profits, they will design sales
strategy spectrum and trading schemes to maximize bandwidth
available for use by subscribers. Therefore, a key issue is to
design spectrum management schemes that can incentivize the
participation of terrestrial agents while optimizing the profits
of the satellite communications systems.
In addition, it is worth noting that though a previous
work [10] also focus on improving the efficiency of spectrum
management in satellite communication systems, the specific
technical approach and key objectives are very different. [10]
only investigated optimal spectrum pricing between satellite
systems and satellite users, whereas this paper discusses the
use of optimal incentive mechanism among terrestrial agent
and the satellite systems. Besides, unlike [10], which achieves
optimal spectrum sharing by adopting game theory as a
mathematical tool to achieve pricing bargaining, this paper
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Fig. 1. Oblique projector
the basis of the incentive schemes.
In this paper, an agent-based spectrum optimization scheme
for satellite communication systems is proposed. Our goal
is to achieve an optimal cooperative mechanism between
satellite systems and terrestrial agent to encourage the agent
to maximize satellite spectrum benefits with the allocated
bandwidth. We investigate the mechanism for achieving a
balance between the marginal cost on transmission capacity of
the satellite systems and the incentive payment to terrestrial
agent. Specifically, the satellite systems need to find an optimal
condition such that, while encouraging terrestrial agent to
devise better schemes to cater for stochastic user demand,
they will not be exposed to excessive unpredictable market
risk. We firstly describe the dynamic process of terrestrial
agent’s revenue, then discuss the incentive condition of optimal
spectrum leasing contract. Finally, the differential equations
required to be met by satellite systems are defined. The
performance of the systems’ profits which can be affected
by various market volatility and incentive strategy which are
testified in simulation part. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. The system model for the proposed agent-based
satellite spectrum management scheme is given in Section II.
Then, the cooperative mechanism of spectrum trading between
satellite systems and terrestrial agent is presented in Section
III. In Section IV, numerical results are provided to evaluate
the proposal’s performances. Last, we conclude this paper in
Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, a high-throughput multibeam satellite systems
comprising of N beams to serve a specific area is considered.
The satellite systems are supposed to operate in Ka-band.
Since the scenario involves flexible resource management, it is
assumed that the satellite payload is equipped with necessary
modules, such as multiport amplifiers, flexible traveling wave
tube amplifiers, etc.
In this spectrum management model, several key factors
including satellite systems’ investment in spectrum band and
















Fig. 2. Spectrum reuse in multibeam satellite systems
be involved in. Satellite systems’ investment means marginal
cost when they authorize certain amount of satellite band
leased to terrestrial agent. The marginal cost is related to
bandwidth and spectrum quality which is related to internet
interference and frequency characteristics. In this paper, we
take into account the oblique projection in multibeam satellite
communications as shown in Fig. 1. The angle θ describing
the deviation angle between user (α, 1) and center point o of
cell α can be expressed as
θ =arccos
(





where dso denotes the distance between cell center and the
satellite as shown in Fig. 1. dsMn denotes the distance between
user (M,n) and the subastral point, doMn denotes the distance
between user (M,n) and cell center o, and R means the earth
radius. Besides, the spectrum reuse and inter-cell interference
in multibeam satellite systems are considered. As shown in
Fig. 2, we assume user n at cell M will suffer interference
from user c at cell U where the cells in same color share same
spectrum band. Then, for the uplink channel, the receiving








where pn is the transmit power of satellite user n, gn(αn)
is the antenna gain of satellite user n at direction αn. θMn
denotes the derivation angle of user n to the central line of
cell M . GM (θMn ) denotes the antenna gain of satellite cell M
in direction θMn . dn denotes the straight-line distance between
n and the satellite system. λ is the wavelength, and fn(αn) is
the channel fading for user n in direction αn. Besides, inter-












where µc denotes the active factor of user c at cell U which
is related to the user’s service type. ρMU is the polarization
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isolation factor between cell M and U .
Then, for satellite user (M,n), the transmission capacity











where ρMn is the transmit power of user (M,n), N0(εMn)
denotes the noise, gMn and GM denote the antenna gain and
dUc denotes the straight-line distance from user Uc to the
satellite system. User Uc locating in adjacent cell shares the
same band with Mn.
The management model consists of risk-neutral satellite sys-
tems and terrestrial agent. Satellite systems own the spectrum
resource, while terrestrial agent takes the charge of it and
uses the satellite band for leasing. Suppose cumulative selling
process At meets the differential equation as below
dAt = atµdt+ σBt, t ≥ 0, (5)
where σ > 0 is the volatility of At, B = {Bt : 0 ≤ t <
∞} which means the Brownian motion in given probability
space denoting as (Ω,z, P ). In spectrum selling process,
the terrestrial agent’s effort level’s at ∈ [0, 1] apparently
impacts satellite systems’ return rate. Terrestrial agent pays
more effort to selling spectrum, then at is bigger which leads
higher systems’ return rate. Meanwhile, terrestrial agent’s
private benefit will decrease due to less private time for other
activities.
It is considered the profits of satellite systems are propor-
tional to bandwidth number leased. The actual profits can be
expressed as
dYt = (π
n − Ut)dAt −Kt(ϵdt+ υdNt), (6)
where Kt denotes the overall investment of the satellite
systems poured into this trading until time t. The investment
means marginal cost for the systems which can be given by
K = ηC, (7)
where C given in (4) denotes the transmission capacity based
on given bandwidth. It should also be noted that the capacity
will be affected by many factors such as satellite fading
channel, users’ transmit power and inter-cell interference.
Besides, in (6), πn ∈ {πh, πl} is a two-dimensional Markov
transformation process which denotes the change of spectrum
selling. Ut denotes the terrestrial agent’s remuneration. ϵ
denotes linear growth rate, and υ is a given constant. Due to
the probability of this kind of market change, we use Poisson
stochastic process N = {Nt}t≥0 to represent the number of
times at clock t, {Tk}k≥1 denotes the time of kth accident, At
denotes the density of accident happened. In actual operation
of spectrum selling, satellite systems and terrestrial agent
have to confront market risk, such as significant volatility
of satellite users’ demand and policy. Suppose the damage
induced by significant market volatility is proportional to
satellite systems’ investment on bandwidth number released
which can be expressed by υKt.
In the proposed model, satellite systems pay the terrestrial
agent according to the benefits they earned. When the agent
makes lots of efforts and enable satellite systems to reap
more profits, high remunerations are expected despite its
additionally private incomes and time decrease. Therefore,
it’s a balance for terrestrial agent to choose which kind of
effort level it should pay. Also, satellite systems require to
balance the remunerations they pay to the agent and their own
profits. Thus, there exists an optimal cooperative mechanism
ϕ = (I, U, τ) for this agent-based spectrum trading. This
mechanism needs to assign satellite systems’ spectrum invest-
ment decision It, terrestrial agent’s remuneration Ut which is
its utility function, and the termination time of this cooperation
τ .
The mechanism requires to inspire the agent for better
sales, and maximize satellite systems’ benefits meanwhile. The
agent’s effort level depends on the remuneration it achieved,
and it’s labor cost must be paid with non-decreasing Ut.
According to terrestrial agent’s effort level at ∈ [0, 1], (0 ≤






e−γt(dUt + λ(1− at)µKtdt
+ Iat<1△αKtbdt)],
(8)
where the second item denotes the private income of terrestrial
agent when it choose at < 1. K, I denotes total bandwidth
number and the ratio of leased band, γ denotes the discount
rate of terrestrial agent, λ is the monetary coefficient. E(·)
means mathematical expectation. For terrestrial agent, the
payment it receives should not be less than the revenue of
other opportunities, i.e., Wt > 0,∀t > 0. Then, Based on the
proposed cooperative mechanism Φ = (I, U, τ), the satellite























III. COOPERATIVE MECHANISM OF SPECTRUM TRADING
According to the requirements of optimal contract between
satellite systems and terrestrial agent, we aims to investigate
the dynamic process of the agent’s utility function so as to
ascertain the optimal incentive conditions and achieve the
differential equation met by satellite systems.
Based on the cumulative information of spectrum trading,






To maintain incentive effect which makes terrestrial agent
to choose at = 1, we have the essential condition as
at = 1 ⇐⇒ βt ≥ λ, h ≥ b, t ≥ 0, (11)
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where h = HK . We assume the satellite systems’ benefits is in
direct proportion to the spectrum they leased, which means
F (K,W, πn) = Kfn(ω), (12)
where fn(w) denotes the benefits reaped by satellite systems
in per band, W = WK denotes the corresponding discount
value in unit band. Thus, we can degrade the optimal contract
problem with two state variables K,Wt to objective function
with single variable w = WK .
Besides, satellite systems can choose to pay terrestrial agent
Uo in one-time cash or in delayed way. When there is
fn(ω) ≥ fn(ω − Uo)− Uo, (13)
which means f ′(ω) ≥ −1, thus the agent’s marginal payment
cost dose not exceed the payment cost of one-time cash. In
this case, the one-time payment will not adopted. Furthermore,
defining ω1 as the threshold of delayed payment, we have
f ′n(ω
1) = −1, f ′′n (ω1) = 0. (14)
It can be defined Uo = max(ω−ω1, 0), wherein in case of
ωt > ω
1, terrestrial agent can reap cash payment of ωt − ω1
and there is f(ωt) = f(ω1) − (ωt − ω1). When ωt ∈ [b, ω1],
the agent’s remuneration will be delayed to pay with Uo = 0.
Therefore, in our optimal incentive contract model, when ω ∈
[b, ω1], the discount value ω in unit spectrum should meet the
following equation
dωt =(γ − i+ δ)ωtdt+ λσdBt − b(αdt− dNt)+
ψmn(ω)(dMt − ξndt),
(15)
where λ is the parameter of private benefit for terrestrial agent,




{µπn − αυ − ϵ+ fn(ω)(i− δ)− ωf ′n(ω)






which is subject to β = λ, h = b;f ′n(ω1 = −1), f ′′n (ω1 = 0);
f(b) = l,
(17)
where (m,n) ∈ {(h, l), (l, h)}, ψnm = ΨnmK , i =
I
K . When
ω ∈ [0, b], the cooperation is terminated. Satellite systems
receive liquidation value wherein f(ω = l). When ω ≥ ω1,
terrestrial agent receives profits ω1 − ω and systems’ utility
function in unit spectrum will be f(ωt) = f(ω1)− (ωt−ω1).
Then, the optimal spectrum investment rate i and terrestrial
agent’s adjusting cost satisfy the following equations
in(ω) =
fn(ω)− ωf ′(ω)− 1
θ
(18)
f ′(ω) = f ′m(ω + ψnm(ω)), (19)
where ω + ψnm(ω) ≥ b. Otherwise ψnm(ω) = b − ω, the
trading cooperation terminates.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





























Fig. 3. System profits with various π
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the impacts of agency cost and
market volatility on systems’ profits. In this circumstance,
the satellite systems are supposed to work in channelized
TDM mode with spectrum reuse between various beams to
enhance spectrum efficiency. External interference caused by
other satellite systems are ignored.
In Fig. 3, we give the performances of satellite systems’
profits in unit spectrum with changing cost paid to terrestrial
agent. In this test, transforming coefficient π is changing
from 0.6 to 1.1. Furthermore, η = 1, C = 4, ϵ = 1.5,
υ = 1, σ = 0.2, λ = 0.2. As shown in Fig. 3, with
the increase of terrestrial agent’s revenue paid by satellite
systems, systems’ profits can reap proportional growth at the
initial stage because proper remuneration is essential for the
agent to keep incentive effects. Meanwhile, when terrestrial
agent’s revenue continues increasing, systems’ profits begin
to decrease which denotes the agent’s cost affects the overall
benefits of satellite systems in turn. Thus, the marginal effects
of raising agent’s revenue reduce or the terrestrial agent has
paid all its available time on spectrum selling. It is a key
point for satellite systems to balance the payment for inspiring
terrestrial agent and their own benefits. In addition, with the
decrease of sale transforming parameter π which means more
market risk or degrading user demands, the satellite systems’
profits is affected apparently.
In Fig. 4, we evaluate the performances of satellite sys-
tems’ profits from another aspect in which various monetary
transforming coefficients η are applied. When transforming
coefficient η is relatively high, more benefits can be reaped
by the terrestrial agent. Thus, same satellite bandwidth may
means various utilities for different terrestrial users. Besides,
heterogeneous user demands may also have an effect on
the spectrum trading which is beyond our current research.
As shown from Fig. 4, when terrestrial agent receives more
rational utility function due to higher transforming coefficient
η, it will be well inspired to pay more time on improving
spectrum selling. More systems’ profits and agent payments
5





























Fig. 4. System profits with various η

























Fig. 5. Network utility
will be realized in this case.
In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we give the numerical results of
simulation tests that compare between the proposed agent-
based method and other traditional solutions including color-
ing and average spectrum management methods. In coloring-
based management method, terrestrial agent is not adopted
and the satellite spectrum will be reused and allocated in a
balanced way without large variance. In the comparison tests,
we divide the satellite spectrum into uniform sub-channels for
leasing. As shown in Fig. 5, when stimulating terrestrial agent
to optimize the spectrum usage, more network utilities can be
attained. Besides, in Fig. 6, the performance of average Quality
of Experience (QoE) for satellite users is presented. Wherein,
for average spectrum allocation strategy, the satellite spectrum
is scheduled to terrestrial users in a fixed and uniform manner
which likely leads to low QoEs of hot terminals.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we proposed an optimal cooperation scheme




















Fig. 6. Quality of Experience
satellite spectrum trading. In general, satellite spectrum is
always allocated to terrestrial users by leasing at fixed or
dynamic mode wherein a terrestrial agent is usually essential
to fulfill this trading. The main contribution of this paper is that
we designed a proper incentive mechanism for terrestrial agent
with the ultimate intention of maximizing satellite systems’
profits. When authorizing an agent to perform satellite spec-
trum selling, a rational contract between participants is critical
to combat market risk and achieve win-win results. In our
proposal, we ascertain the optimal incentive condition of this
spectrum trading cooperation and proper liquidation threshold
for satellite systems to reduce damage. Our research reveals
not only spectrum pricing but also proper trading contract
plays a key role in satellite spectrum optimization. Numerical
results show that market volatility and the revenue received
by terrestrial agent have apparent impacts on satellite systems’
profits.
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